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MarkPeterson’sThe City-State of Boston is a formidablework of history—
prodigiously researched, lucidly written, immense in scope, and yet
scrupulously detailed. A meticulous history of New England over more
than two centuries, the book argues that Boston and its hinterland
emerged as a city-state, a “self-governing republic” that was committed
first and foremost to its own regional autonomy (p. 6). Rather than as a
British colonial outpost or the birthplace of the American Revolution—
the site of a nationalist struggle for independence—the book recovers
Boston’s long-lost tradition as a “polity in its own right,” a fervently inde-
pendent hub of Atlantic trade whose true identity placed it in tension
with the overtures of both the British Empire and, later, the American
nation-state (p. 631).
What are the stakes in advancing this type of reinterpretation? And in
what ways do the implications extend beyond New England’s parochial
concerns? To fully appreciate the book’s contribution, it makes sense to
think of it not simply as a standalone achievement but as a capstone to
several important inversions in recent historiography of theUnited States.
The first inversion is the recasting of Southern history as national
history. For most of the twentieth century, historians of the American
South were quintessential regionalists (C. Vann Woodward, The
Burden of Southern History [1960]). The South, these historians
explained, was an idiosyncratic antibourgeois section besieged within a
liberal nation. White Southerners fought to protect their “peculiar insti-
tution” on behalf of states’ rights, pushing back against the encroach-
ments of Federal power and the capitalist marketplace. They lost the
Civil War and ultimately gave way—a few reactionary remnants notwith-
standing—to national consolidation and urban-industrial modernity.
Nomore. Over the last twenty years, the history of the South has emphat-
ically become American history. Armed with the potent power of slavery,
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we now learn, the cotton kingdom provided the essential engine behind
America’s capitalist takeoff and its relentless territorial drive (Caitlin
Rosenthal, Accounting for Slavery: Masters and Management [2018];
Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the
Making of American Capitalism [2014]). As Americans for all intents
and purposes, white Southerners defined the institutions of the U.S.
state and dominated Washington all the way to the Civil War and
beyond (Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at
the Helm of American Foreign Policy [2016]). Far from receding in
the aftermath of defeat, they forged a resilient legacy that continues to
shape the United States all the way to the twenty-first century, as
evident in Americans’ perennial resistance to taxation or their racialized
welfare state (Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins
of Our Time [2013]).
A second, related, historiographical inversion involves some unin-
tuitive changes to the geographical scale of historical analysis. Modern,
twentieth-century U.S. history was once organized around the study of
national politics and international affairs. More recently, this approach
has been sidelined in favor of metropolitan histories and the discovery
that “all politics is local,” with a particular focus on contests over prop-
erty taxes and residential segregation. (See, for example, Thomas J.
Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in
Postwar Detroit [1996]; Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The
Origins of the New American Right [2001]; N. D. B. Connolly, A
World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow
South Florida [2014]; Paige Glotzer, How the Suburbs Were Segre-
gated: Developers and the Business of Exclusionary Housing, 1890–
1960 [2020].) An analogous flip has taken place in the study of Early
America—but in the opposite direction. As historians of the modern
United States have become increasingly focused on local politics, histo-
rians of the colonial period—previously the authors of highly textured
community studies—started to examine the North American colonies
as part of the larger “Atlantic World.” Turning their attention to the
long-distance and entangled oceanic connections that shaped early set-
tlement in North America, they have embedded colonial America in a
broader geography of empire, trade, migration, and intellectual
exchange (David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., The British
Atlantic World, 1500–1800 [2002]; Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History:
Concept and Contours [2005]; Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Defini-
tions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” The American Historical Review
[June 2006]).
Third, Americanists have developed an increasing fascination with
counterfactuals. Historians are conventionally taught that what did not
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happen is not history and that reflecting, let alone speculating, about
alternative histories is a dangerous exercise. More recently, this position
too has been rethought. Americanists like Richard White have advanced
the notion that in fact “we need to think about what did not happen in
order to think historically” (White, Railroaded [2011], 517). In this
view, historians must uncover the paths not taken as a way of grasping
the open-ended and contingent nature of history. A far greater sin is to
take the end point of a historical process too much for granted,
thereby infusing historical narratives with dangerous teleology. Taken
a bit further, one senses a deeper desire to defy posterity. It is almost
as if historians find the actual course of history to be stifling and even
tedious. In this vein, to name one prominent example, Walter Johnson
deliberately turns his study of the slave South away from the focus on
origins of the Civil War. His account instead lingers on how white South-
erners boldly imagined their future, including, for example, their plot to
extend their slave empire into Latin America and reopen the Atlantic
slave trade, which, he argues, is “revealing for the merciful fact that
it never came to pass” (Johnson, River of Dark Dreams [2013], 17).
This horrifying specter looms larger in his narrative than the less thrill-
ing history of the Confederacy and its collapse, an outcome that this
account is by design not geared to explain.
Peterson’s history of Boston marks a tectonic shift akin to, and con-
gruent with, these three inversions. First and foremost, his account is all
too happy, perhaps even overeager, to concede American history to the
South. In casting New England as an autonomous region, at odds with
American nationalism, Peterson departs from a venerable scholarly
tradition, stretching from the likes of Francis Parkman to Perry Miller,
that took for granted that New England’s origins were America’s. For
Peterson, theirs was an unfortunate misreading. Rather than being rep-
resentative of North American colonization as a whole, let alone a stand-
in for the American nation, Boston was in fact “peculiar,” “different,” and
even “exceptional” (pp. 84, 167). Flipping on its head Eugene Genovese’s
memorable formulation of the South’s relationship to capitalism,
Peterson argues that New England was “fully in, but not completely of”
its surrounding contexts (p. 66).
In Peterson’s telling, New Englanders successfully pursued and sus-
tained the independence of the city-state for more than two centuries,
again and again resisting intrusions from the British Empire and the
U.S. government. He builds a persuasive case. Bostonians jealously
guarded the self-sovereignty that allowed them to thrive as traders
within a larger system of global commerce. In cautious defiance of
royal and parliamentary decrees, they issued their own silver coins and
paper money to lubricate regional exchange and erect their own “fiscal
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military state.” They traded with Britain’s rivals around the world in vio-
lation of the Navigation Acts and overturned the conversion of the colony
into a royal dominion. Their quest for autonomy reached its climax in the
run-up to the American Revolution, whichmarked yet another chapter in
New England’s quest to retain its liberties. The last episode in this
sequence was the botched secessionist Hartford Convention of 1815,
which unsuccessfully asserted regional autonomy, this time within the
framework of the Union.
Regional independence in no way meant isolationism or localism,
hence the book’s strong Atlanticist orientation. Self-government
allowed Bostonians to forge long-distance connections across the
world. The book thus offers a remarkable study of a city that takes
place largely away from its home turf, sailing far afield from Boston’s
Shawmut Peninsula to Bermuda, Guinea, Göttingen, London, Potosí,
Havana, Hanover, Amsterdam, Canton, and Acadia. Preoccupied with
situating Boston in a larger geography, Peterson explores the city’s
entanglements in the great English civil wars, the international Protes-
tant revival, the Atlantic slave trade and Haitian Revolution, the Euro-
pean imperial contests, and radical ferment in post-Napoleonic
Germany. The individual chapters are framed around exceedingly
well-rendered biographical sketches that explore the formative experi-
ences of prominent Bostonians in these remote locales, experiences
that in turn shaped the history of their hometown. This framework nec-
essarily privileges the purview of merchant princes, high diplomats, and
imperial officials. With hardly a farming household or artisanal work-
shop in sight, this is unapologetically a cosmopolitan history with free
trade, exchange, and “circulation” as central leitmotifs.
Lastly, the book is strongly antiteleological, aiming to salvage
the city-state from the condescension of nationalist historiography. It
narrates the story of a polity whose topmost commitment was to free
maritime commerce and that had no territorial aspirations beyond its
adjoining region. Peterson does not elide elite Bostonians’ anxiety
about ethnic and racial homogeneity, violence against Indigenous
peoples, and dealings with the slave economies of the Caribbean and
the American South. His account nevertheless underscores their liberal
commitments, acclaiming their sober political leadership, moderation,
worldliness, and sophistication. It foregrounds their antislavery senti-
ments, apprehensions about the militarization of British imperialism,
and alienation from the “winner takes all” political culture of the
young United States. Their quest to preserve Boston’s autonomy as
a city-state, with a preference for “commerce and cooperation” over
“invasion and conquest” (a questionable dichotomy), assumes
historical significance for representing everything that the United
Noam Maggor / 634
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680520000641
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Queen Mary, University of London, on 25 Nov 2020 at 08:37:22, subject to the Cambridge
States—“the nation-state that the South had built”—could never become
(pp. 276–77, 622).
Peterson thus completes a masterful revisionist turn, breathing
fresh life into one of the most exhaustively studied regions in the
United States and bringing the scholarship about New England into
alignment with the other major shifts in American historiography. But,
for these very reasons, the book also reveals some real and broadly symp-
tomatic limitations.
For starters, the decoupling of New England from American history
not only conveniently associates U.S. nationalism, especially its most
pernicious aspects, with the slaveholding South. It also radically under-
states the centrality of the liberals from the Northeast in shaping the tra-
jectory of the American republic, not excluding its land-grabbing, war-
making, and resource-extracting proclivities. As a result, Peterson
shows little interest in some of New England’s favored sons. He says
almost nothing about John Quincy Adams, who supported the Louisiana
Purchase, bargained hard for the Adams-Onís Treaty (also known as the
Transcontinental Treaty) that extended American sovereignty from
Florida to the Pacific, and famously envisioned Cuba and Puerto Rico
as “natural appendages” of the United States; or Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story, a born-and-bred New Englander, who espoused
Federal activism on behalf of “the commercial and national concerns
of the United States,” including a strong army, navy, and central bank;
or Daniel Webster, “Defender of the Constitution” and apologist for
slavery on behalf of New England’s textile magnates, whom Peterson
writes off in good Puritan fashion for having “sold his soul to the
money devil” (p. 484). Such distinguished men represented a social
class that was bent not on surrendering Boston’s autonomy to a domi-
neering South but on forging a capacious national state, which they
fully intended to govern in their own best interests. Peterson refuses to
contend with their lasting legacy and its effects.
The lack of engagement with New Englanders’ own designs for the
United States speaks to a broader weakness with the “city-state” as an
organizing schema, namely, that it is not dynamic enough to effectively
explain change over time. While the book’s Atlanticism offers a compel-
ling critique of nationalist teleologies, it struggles to account for the Bos-
tonians’ deeper motivations as a bourgeois class, especially as they—the
same families and inmany cases the very same individuals—turned away
from ocean shipping to textile manufacturing, and then to cross-regional
finance and banking. Was not this capacity to repeatedly reinvent them-
selves and their city one of the Bostonians’ defining qualities, one that
indeed marked them as in some ways different from their brethren in
the South? The book never reflects on this question. Instead, it treats
Review Essay / 635
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007680520000641
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Queen Mary, University of London, on 25 Nov 2020 at 08:37:22, subject to the Cambridge
the trade-oriented city-state—“the very idea of what Boston had always
stood for”—as sacrosanct, allowing the powerful few to almost unproble-
matically speak for the general interest (p. 577). Any departure from this
hallowed point of origin is excused as either an unfortunate error in judg-
ment (“rash embrace,” “tragic mistake,” “fail[ure]” of foresight [pp. 265,
331, 400]) or the effect of exogenous intrusions by British imperialism
and U.S. nationalism (which “disrupt[ed] and perver[ted]” New Eng-
land’s true inclinations [p. 249]). Analytically, this deeply conservative
stance presents the changing relationship between Boston and the
forces around it not as an ongoing political contest over who governs
and how but as a test of fortitude and fidelity to a longstanding tradition.
In this way, the book inadvertently reproduces a classic discursive
maneuver, one the New Englanders mastered to perfection, which is to
deny the existence of politics even while engaging in it at every turn.
Finally, working against the historical grain, Peterson folds the
Bostonians’ clear moment of triumph, the Civil War, into a melancholy
declension narrative about the city-state’s “dissolution” and even “dis-
memberment” (pp. 20, 541). Members of a confident, aggressive, and
affluent urban elite, with continental ambitions and a strong sense of
superiority, are thus allowed to represent themselves (in typical height-
ened language) as somehow perpetually beleaguered “under Virginia’s
thumb”—unwitting heirs to an America not of their own making
(p. 617). Needless to say, this does not square well with the realities of
Southern secession and the emergence of the United States as an indus-
trial and imperial power over the following decades, a process that was
presided over in large part by the folks from Harvard Yard. Ironically,
the nationalist historiography Peterson is keen to debunk—authored
disproportionately by New Englanders and New England–educated
scholars—reflects precisely the assertion of regional and class power
that the narrative downplays. But more significantly, this implausible
end point is characteristic of a topsy-turvy historiography that seeks to
“escape the inevitability of the present” at the cost of skewing our
sense of the past—the losers are the winners, the periphery overwhelms
the core, the powerful are downtrodden, and the systemic is contingent—
in ways that make accounting for it almost into an afterthought. The
Brahmins of Boston would not have it any other way.
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